[I have presented this paper in the “Human and Physical Infrastructure in the Contemporary Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean” workshop, which was organized by Hebrew University of Jerusalem Asian and African Studies Institute with the cooperation of Yeditepe University. The meeting was located at Yad Izhak Ben Zvi Center in Jerusalem/ISRAEL; on the date of October 15, 2006. Our session's title was “Water: Shared Commodity or a Source of Conflict”.] Dear Alon Liel was our chairman.
Merry Christmas and happy new years.
Asst.Prof.Dr.Deniz Tansi
INTRODUCTION
In the date of October 12-13 2004, there was organized a symposium about water issue which indicated Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue. The symposium was realized by Circle of Mediterranean Parliamentaries for Sustainable Development (COMPSUD) in Kadir Has University. I was reporter of a session That meeting promoted my mind for this study. In this context, speakers have expressed that, EU’s cooperation with Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestine was increased. A point was highlighted which meant that, NGO’s have been committed more important functions than parliaments in the head of environmental assistance.
Beside EU’s enlargement (2004) EU Environmental Cooperation with the Balkans and Mediterranean targeted to finance new projects and to support action plans in the neighbour countries. As we note, Western Balkan countries, (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo are commented as potential candidate countries to EU). That policy is commented in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). ENP aims to connect relations between EU, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Eastern Mediterranean must be considered on ENP base. Turkey and Israel occur in Eastern Mediterranean. In this study, Middle Eastern Water Issue is analyzed with Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue. Technical details is not used intensively. Transboundary water concept is especially strategic for the region. But instead of case studies, EU’s approach is evaluated. Why we prefer this method, international regulations in ENP context is accepted by Turkey and Israel. So, principles and agreements will be commented to Mediterranean basin.
Turkey and Israel can not be evaluated only with Middle East. They are also in Eastern Mediterranean basin and share this basin with other Mediterranean countries. But we must add that, we do not consider about only sea water but also rivers, lakes, underground water resources. The main question, if there can be a permanent regulation system in Mediterranean and surely Middle East.
ENP’s action plan contains four main items. “1- Internal Market 2- Cooperation on Freedom, Security and Justice 3- Connecting the Neighbourhood and Environment 4- People to People Issues. Guiding Principles of ENP are:
• Building sustainable development and enhancing basis for good environmental governance
• Need for differentiation
• Building on existing cooperation
• Need for prioritization
• Commitment and ownership
• Coherent with EU domestic policies”
ENP is built on common values which are, rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. On the base of EU’s strategies, main exit point is about Mediterranean Water Crisis why water resources’ productive organization is considered. Mediterranean is categorized sub regions. Those regions: Portugal, Spain, France, Monaco, Italy, Slovenia, Crotia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Turkey Northern Mediterranean; Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine Middle East; Southern Cyprus , Malta, Greek, Italian, French, Spanish and Tunisian islands consist Mediterranean Islands. European Water Framework is planned on these regions in the prior of EU. In this study, we will analyze Middle Eastern Water Issue in the context of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP(BARCELONA PROCESS)
Euro Mediterranean Partnership is the main base for Euro-Mediterranean Water Framework which is determined by ENP. Let’s consider this process from official document of COMPSUD. “The Barcelona process started in 1995, which promoted a new regional relationship and indicated a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the Barcelona declaration, the 27 Euro-Mediterranean partners (in 1995 EU had 15 members, 27 included 15 EU members and 12 partners in the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Southern Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) established the three main objectives of the partnership:
1- The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue.
2- The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment (by 2010) of a free trade zone.
3- The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.”
If ENP is planned for founding also a free trade zone, there can be an interactive relation with Middle East Free Trade Area.( MEFTA). MEFTA is intensively designed by USA, ENP is designed by EU. Free trade zones crossroads would meet in Eastern Mediterranean. ENP is political and economic network, ENP would create a Euro-Mediterranean zone. EU build Euro-Mediterranean dialogue with two main methods. “
1- Bilateral dimension: The EU carries out a number of activities bilaterally with each country. The most important are the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements that the Union negotiates with the Mediterranean partners individually. They reflect the general principles governing the new Euro-Mediterranean relationship, although they each contain characteristics specific to the relations between the EU and each Mediterranean partner.
2- Regional dimension: Regional dialogue represents one of the most innovative aspects of the partnership, covering at the same time the political, economic and cultural fields (regional cooperation). Regional cooperation has a considerable strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many Mediterranean partners while it emphasizes the national complementarities.”
EU’s Barcelona Process aims to found a stabilization area in Mediterranean why EU shares Mediterranean Basin with non EU countries. Therefore Mediterranean’s stabilization is a security issue for EU. Also, EU wants to influence the region. Mediterranean Basin is not only a security zone for EU, as we point out, but also economic, political and cultural zone. Barcelona Process is institutionalized these relations with agreements. Water is important about EU’s influence. It can become a threat or opportunity for EU. In this context Turkey and Israel are key actors. Turkey is a official candidate country for EU full membership and also member of NATO. Israel is connected with Western countries with economic, political relations.
EU SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (EU SDS)
For understanding Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, first of all, we must learn main objectives and priorities of EU SDS. In the COMPSUD paper, EU SDS is explained on these indicated parameters. “At the Goteborg European Council in June 2001, EU leaders adopted an European Union Strategy for sustainable Development. (EU SDS) It included a third dimension –the environment- to the twin social and economic pillars they had identified at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 as key factors in the creation of an internationally competitive and socially inclusive European Union. In this context, the EU SDS is based on the idea that in the longer run economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection must go hand in hand. This entails a process in which a wide variety of actors, including European and national policy makers, the business community and civil society, bear a shared responsibility.
Four issues have importance about this strategy which have been indicated –Climate change and clean energy, Public health, Management of natural resources, Mobility, land use and territorial environment- . The commission proposes these issues as a set of priority and measures at EU level.
The external dimension of the strategy (towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development) setting out the EU’s contribution to global Sustainable Development has been agreed by the Commission and endorsed by the Environment Council in February 2002. Prior objectives aims to fight poverty and promote social development and to promote the sustainable management of natural and environmental resources.”
EU SDS promotes “sustainable management of marine and coastal zones” and “sustainable management of water”. This strategy has also correlational links about EU WFD. In this context Mediterranean Basin is evaluated as a water management zone. EU directs this process with non EU partners. EU doesn’t want a Southern Mediterranean which exist against to herself. EU SDS provides Mediterranean in only one axis. If it can’t be realized, Mediterranean can become a conflict area.
WATER CRISIS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
To analyze EU and Mediterranean zone’s water situation, we must understand, its water problems. According to Scoullos and Tomassini, there is a chronic water crisis in Mediterranean zone. But it means that, EU has same problem why she shares Mediterranean zone with non EU countries. So that, EU tries to find solutions about water crisis. The situation is also about EU’s security. EU’s endeavour is about to found a water framework with non EU countries which positioned in Mediterranean zone. Currently EU has 25 members. In 2007 Romania and Bulgaria will be member of EU. We consider about 27+12 countries. EU’s water strategy includes a region from Black Sea to Atlantic Ocean and to Red Sea. EU develops her ‘water strategy’ to live in the Mediterranean zone and to effect the other countries why to provide ‘neighbourhood policies’ Water scarcity threatens EU’s existence. Let’s consider about water scarcity. “ Water scarce countries are defined as those with less than 1000 cubic meters of fresh water available per person per year. It is not enough for those countries to provide adequate food or support economic development and a potential cause of severe environmental problems. Countries with 1000 to 1700 cubic meters per person per year are said to be ‘water stressed.’ ”. According to same resources, the arid and semi-arid countries of the Mediterranean combine a low rate of rainfall and a high rate of evaporation and transpiration. In the Middle East the Syrian Desert (Badiath El –Sham) occupies the eastern parts of Syria and Jordan, and the Negev desert encompasses the southern part of Israel extending south to the city of Eliath on the Gulf of Aqaba.
In this context, the various Mediterranean subregions and countries are reflected in the availability and access to water resources. Growth of population provokes water demand, but water supply is not enough to respond it. Scoullos and Tomassini indicates that, WHO has established a norm of 20 litres per capita per day for water use to satisfy the very basic personal and hygiene requirements. 10 lcd serve drinking and cooking needs, while the remainder goes to bathing –particularly hand washing. When water is expensive, it must be collected, if total consumption is cut under to 15 lcd, there can be possible high health risks.
According to statistics the total population of all Mediterranean countries amounted in the year 2000 to 442.5 million, where average population density was approximately 50 persons per km2. There is great differences between Middle Eastern countries about using arable lands. For instance, Egypt has 2000 people per arable hectare, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon have more than 500. In the Middle East countries, the percentage of the urban population is expected to increase from 80.84% to 81.90% in 2050. These datas show us, increasing of the population and urbanization will conclude pressures on water supply and management systems.
Mediterranean’s water crisis feeds from water conflicts. Shared water systems are the main sources of water conflicts. “Some transboundary, groundwater resources (aquifers) contain considerable fresh water quantities, enough to provide safe and good quality drinking water for many years.”
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System and the situation of Euphrates and Tigris case are considered about shared water systems.
MAIN CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
For the dialogue of effective water governance in the Mediterranean, there were made some decisions in the international meetings. “At the Cairo Workshop (December 2001) and Athens Conference (March 2002) a set of critical issues for an effective water governance in the Mediterranean were identified. Main challenges are:
• Establish proper governance of water as a common good
• Overcome fragmentation of institutions
• Overcome single sector approach
• Correct inappropriate legislative framework
• Promote enforcement mechanisms
• Mobilize financial resources and attract investment
• Promote effective multi-stakeholder participation
• Improve accountability and transparency in water management
• Utilize education and capacity building and develop knowledge and skills
• Address specificities and develop appropriate approaches for isolated Mediterranean islands.”
MAIN HEADLINES OF EURO-MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE
If we summarize of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue’s main headlines, we can analyze its strategy. Attractive outlines are listed below:
- EU-Mediterranean Dialogue on the Sustainable Development and to use of water. (In this context the Mediterranean is targeted to make peace and stabilization area, to found political and cultural security, multilateral and regional development in the Euro-Mediterranean sphere.)
- Water Framework Directive is found on these principles. (On this framework application of integrated approachment to water resources, integration approachment, information availability and accessibility, Mediterranean’s turning account of these opportunities is planned. EU’s Water Development Strategy is targeted to create with the dialogue between non EU countries
- Realization of EU Water Iniataitive Mediterranean Part is objected with the cooperation among healthy demand, water programme and projects.
- Accession to water poverty regions is targeted.
- In the context of EU Mediterranean Multilateral Dialogue, cooperation with Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestine will be increased.
- NGO’s have more important functions than parliaments.
- EU’s environmental cooperation with Balkans and Mediterranean must be considered on this statement.
- EU’s bilateral relations with the Mediterranean countries is explained on the institutional agreements with Tunusia, Morocco, Israel and Lebanon. According to EU, the process will be sustained with Egypt and Algeria. Negotiations with Syria is continued. Environment sub committees are founded.
- In the headline of environmental assistance, short and medium term action plan, local water directive and water information network issues exist. To continue current programs with third countries, finance will be provided by EU.
- In the headline of Mediterranean-Private objectives, to progress current cooperation mechanisms. (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, EU Neighbourhood Policy, EU Investment Bank’s operations are indicated.) In this context, to use MEDA for financing environmental integration is underlined.
- To realize further development in EU Neighbourhood Policy and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership area, sustainable development principles will be used. To complete instutional agreements is demanded.
- Stabilization and institutionalization process is highligted for EU Action Plan. In this headline, existing issues are: Current process with Albania, Crotia, Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia, approachment for EU integration, , EU inputs for stabilization act.
CONCLUSION
We have arrived the conclusion in this study, EU plans to be a determiner power in Mediterranean base with sustainable development principles. After EU’s new enlargement process, EU targets to increase her control area with EU Neighbourhood Policy – especially to support poor countries’ financial problems and projects-. In this context, using and managing of water is equally important with oil why water resources are rapidly exhausted. So water resources’ effective using is underlined. EU take attention to control water resources, it is like USA’s oil control trend. Water control is about EU’s demand –it is related to be hegemonic power. EU build infrastructure for water hegemony with institutional agreements, this process provides water control to concern in international law concept. EU considered water control –as she pointed in ‘Turkey Strategy Paper’ in 2004-, to create hinterland about Southern Caucaus, Middle East and Central Asia. In NATO’s İstanbul 2004 Summit, these regions were evaulated in the context of ‘out of area’. Turkey’s status and her geographic area is a key situation about EU and bilateral relations. EU tend to be a problem solver for water conflict in Middle East. It provides to be a strategic power. Turkey and Israel must be evaulated on this base. Surely US policies are also determiner about regional issues. Western approach needs Turkey’s and Israel’s cooperation. But first of all, both of these countries to plan their national interests.
Turkey and Israel must be evaulated in Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA). Qualified Indusrial Zones (QIZ) are the starting point of this project. (QIZ which were founded between Israel and Jordan are the tangible samples of this application.) MEFTA is developed with free trade agreements. Turkey is invited MEFTA as a conditional member of EU. (According to US State Department) US aims to found custom union in Middle East with MEFTA. It provides the region to be integrated to World Trade Organization (WTO). (ENP free trade zone would enlarge MEFTA on a horizontal zone, consequently EU, US, Middle East and Mediterranean Basin would intersect on this line.)
Turkey and Israel are considered also in Proliferation Security Iniatative (PSI). (It aims to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.) They have taken place in PSI exercise recent months which has been applicated in Eastern Mediterranean.
Why I point out these points, Turkey and Israel have a common axis about security, economy and politics. (We must add culture). Bilateral relations surely include to be against terrorism in every where on the earth. (From Northern Iraq to Eastern Mediterranean.)
Water cooperation is part of this axis. US and EU’s regional approaches meet on Turkey’s and Israel’s crossroads. Bilateral relations would integrate the region to the world.
25 Aralık 2009 Cuma
19 Aralık 2009 Cumartesi
TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS DURING 2009
In the date of January 29, 2009 Turkish PM criticized harshly Israel in Davos. We know the crisis called “one minutes!”. PM concerned “Gaza operations” which connected with to use disproportional force on the innocent Palestinians. Turkey has criticized Israel several times from 1950’s. Nonetheless pro Islamic Turkish cabinet’s approach to Israel is perceived ideologically.
Turkey’s cancellation of Anatolian Eagle air force drill was concerned intensively in Turkey and Israel. Firstly, Turkey abolished drill’s international division. It was perceived that Israel was excluded from the drill by Turkey. After the event, US and Italy withdrew from Anatolian Eagle. US and Italy’s behaviour was commented as a protest to Turkey. Also, Turkey’s attitude was evaulated to protest Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza Strip. In Turkish public opinion, there was an intensive debate during Operation Cast Lead why Israeli Air Force planes’ were trained in Anatolian Eagle. Turkish government hesitated critics from pro Islamic fractions.
In fact, another reason the prime minister's anger at December until 2008, Turkey's facilitation in the ongoing Israeli-Syrian negotiations was to cut off. Moreover, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul in December 2008 to the "farewell visit" perform, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel during that period, did not give any information about the operation.
In spite of the high tension, Israel's industry-trade and labor minister Ben Eliezer attended Turkey's anniversary of the founding of Republic Day (October 29, 2009)in Turkey's Tel Aviv embassy. He has made a warmly speech. Eliezer's behaviour was a short but an important step from Israel's side. Last year Israel's president and many ministers of Israel's cabinet had come for October 29 to Turkish embassy. After Ben Eliezer came Turkey for an official visit. He made consultations with Turkish officials include Turkish president. (Except Turkish PM)
Recently Turkish ambassador to Israel (Oguz Cevikkol) invited Israel's defence minister and leader of Labor Party Ehud Barak to Turkey. So Barak will come Turkey officially nexth month. (January 2010)
Turkish president Gul was in Kopenhag about World Climate Summit. Gul and Israel's president Peres met in Kopenhag with their staff. The consultation lasted for an hour.
Reuters, "Turkish president to visit Israel", December 18, 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLDE5BH20Q
After the meeting, a cautious optimism became. Peres repeated Israel's official invitation to Gul. Turkish presidency's official announcement indicated "if conditions would occur, Turkish president will come to Israel in an avaliable time."
Turkey's another expectation is about to have a facilitator role between Israel-Syria negotiaitons again. As we know, Israel PM Netenyahu prefers direct negotiations or instead of Turkey, call France for facilitating. However, potential developments about Turkish-Israeli relations and US approach could bring Turkey as a facilitator once more.
January 29, 2009 was an exception for bilateral relations. Otherwise how can be believable, an US ally country could cut off relations with Israel. It was only an illusion.
Also, pro western moderate Sunni Arab regimes support Fatah and Mahmut Abbas in West Bank. Their preference is related Palestine Authority. In these conditions Turkish cabinet's approach to Hamas, created contradicitions. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia condemned Hizballah during second Lebanon War. According to Israeli press, Israel's former PM Olmert and Saudi officials made consultations in that time. But Turkish cabinet was more anger than Saudi Arabia about Israel. One more point concern Iran's nuclear activities. Turkey vote impartial in IAEA to make sanctions to Iran. Turkey is one of the temporary member of UN Security Council. If all of permanent members would endorse sanctions, what would Turkey do? So, Turkish Foreign Policy's approach during Justice and Development Party era, can not reach a coherent level. Turkey is ally of USA and member of NATO. At last, Turkey would behave with her allies. Neo Ottoman view also could create a frustration on the Arab masses. And Iran is one of the competitor against pro western moderate Sunni Arab regimes. We can note, Gulf Cooperation Council decided to found a common army. It is evaulated to make precaution about Iran's activites from Southern Iraq to Eastern Medirerranean. So Iran's policies mainly target Sunni Arab regimes and Iran uses anti Israeli discourse to legitimate her regional leadership architecture.
Our conclusion underlines 2009 for Turkish-Israeli relations to loss of the time. January 2009 created a higher tension, December 2009 convert it to a reconciliation. Rest of these events are polemics and Middle Eastern leadership dreams.
But bilateral relations are important to sustain stability, democracy, modern economic structures and maintain western values in the region.
Turkey’s cancellation of Anatolian Eagle air force drill was concerned intensively in Turkey and Israel. Firstly, Turkey abolished drill’s international division. It was perceived that Israel was excluded from the drill by Turkey. After the event, US and Italy withdrew from Anatolian Eagle. US and Italy’s behaviour was commented as a protest to Turkey. Also, Turkey’s attitude was evaulated to protest Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza Strip. In Turkish public opinion, there was an intensive debate during Operation Cast Lead why Israeli Air Force planes’ were trained in Anatolian Eagle. Turkish government hesitated critics from pro Islamic fractions.
In fact, another reason the prime minister's anger at December until 2008, Turkey's facilitation in the ongoing Israeli-Syrian negotiations was to cut off. Moreover, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul in December 2008 to the "farewell visit" perform, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel during that period, did not give any information about the operation.
In spite of the high tension, Israel's industry-trade and labor minister Ben Eliezer attended Turkey's anniversary of the founding of Republic Day (October 29, 2009)in Turkey's Tel Aviv embassy. He has made a warmly speech. Eliezer's behaviour was a short but an important step from Israel's side. Last year Israel's president and many ministers of Israel's cabinet had come for October 29 to Turkish embassy. After Ben Eliezer came Turkey for an official visit. He made consultations with Turkish officials include Turkish president. (Except Turkish PM)
Recently Turkish ambassador to Israel (Oguz Cevikkol) invited Israel's defence minister and leader of Labor Party Ehud Barak to Turkey. So Barak will come Turkey officially nexth month. (January 2010)
Turkish president Gul was in Kopenhag about World Climate Summit. Gul and Israel's president Peres met in Kopenhag with their staff. The consultation lasted for an hour.
Reuters, "Turkish president to visit Israel", December 18, 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLDE5BH20Q
After the meeting, a cautious optimism became. Peres repeated Israel's official invitation to Gul. Turkish presidency's official announcement indicated "if conditions would occur, Turkish president will come to Israel in an avaliable time."
Turkey's another expectation is about to have a facilitator role between Israel-Syria negotiaitons again. As we know, Israel PM Netenyahu prefers direct negotiations or instead of Turkey, call France for facilitating. However, potential developments about Turkish-Israeli relations and US approach could bring Turkey as a facilitator once more.
January 29, 2009 was an exception for bilateral relations. Otherwise how can be believable, an US ally country could cut off relations with Israel. It was only an illusion.
Also, pro western moderate Sunni Arab regimes support Fatah and Mahmut Abbas in West Bank. Their preference is related Palestine Authority. In these conditions Turkish cabinet's approach to Hamas, created contradicitions. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia condemned Hizballah during second Lebanon War. According to Israeli press, Israel's former PM Olmert and Saudi officials made consultations in that time. But Turkish cabinet was more anger than Saudi Arabia about Israel. One more point concern Iran's nuclear activities. Turkey vote impartial in IAEA to make sanctions to Iran. Turkey is one of the temporary member of UN Security Council. If all of permanent members would endorse sanctions, what would Turkey do? So, Turkish Foreign Policy's approach during Justice and Development Party era, can not reach a coherent level. Turkey is ally of USA and member of NATO. At last, Turkey would behave with her allies. Neo Ottoman view also could create a frustration on the Arab masses. And Iran is one of the competitor against pro western moderate Sunni Arab regimes. We can note, Gulf Cooperation Council decided to found a common army. It is evaulated to make precaution about Iran's activites from Southern Iraq to Eastern Medirerranean. So Iran's policies mainly target Sunni Arab regimes and Iran uses anti Israeli discourse to legitimate her regional leadership architecture.
Our conclusion underlines 2009 for Turkish-Israeli relations to loss of the time. January 2009 created a higher tension, December 2009 convert it to a reconciliation. Rest of these events are polemics and Middle Eastern leadership dreams.
But bilateral relations are important to sustain stability, democracy, modern economic structures and maintain western values in the region.
16 Aralık 2009 Çarşamba
MIDDLE EASTERN FUNDAMENTALIST SOCIAL NETWORKS’ FUNCTIONS: IN THE CASE OF "DENİZ FENERİ"
Hi, here's my blog in English. I will present my articles and opinions by this channel to rest of the world.
This paper was presented by me on April 4, 2009, in New Orleans/Lousiana.
The symposium was held by Southern Sociological Society in USA. Official schedule was realized between April 1-4, 2009 in Monteolone Hotel. Symposium's theme was Inequalities Across the Life Course. Our session's name was Political Sociology I which was realized among 11:00-12:20 hours in No:161 room. My paper's name was “Middle Eastern Fundamentalist Social Networks' Functions: In the Case of Deniz Feneri”
My best regards,
Dr.Deniz Tansi
Especially in the Middle East, fundamentalist Islamist groups, gain their legitimacy with their own social networks. From Afghanistan to Palestine, different Islamist factions applicate this method. Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Palestine , Hizballah in Lebanon, have powerful social networks.
However, the social networks which is underlined in this study, can not be a solution against poverty. These fundamentalist groups feed from poverty. Social networks do not target to found a social state. And not about to reduce inequalities.
Main problem, to delay democratic demands and to establish a totalitarian religious regime.
In Turkish public opinion , the social network which is called as “Deniz Feneri” became a corruption issue. Corruption is related to support political Islam with donations. But citizens’ donations demand is about just to help innocent, poor people. Some of the social networks manipulate persons’ emotions.
“Deniz Feneri” is an indicator for understanding “Moderate Islam” debates. Moderate Islam’s financial infrastructure and political solidarity can be perceived with “Deniz Feneri”s mechanism.
We will analyze “Deniz Feneri”s approach to comment Middle Eastern social networks’ functions. In this context, will try to indicate fundemantalist social networks do not want to destroy inequalities but to maintain them for arriving or keeping political powers.
And fundamentalist approaches target to capture all spheres of the life why they are totalitarian.
“DENİZ FENERİ” CASE AS A SOCIAL NETWORK
Social networks are so strategic for the current societies. According to Castells, “religious fundametalism – Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, and even Buddhist- is probably the most formidable force for personal security and collective mobilization in these troubled times. In a world of global flows of wealth, power and images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes the fundamental source of social meaning.” Therefore religious fundamentalism feeds and creates social networks in the global world.
In Turkey, like other Middle Eastern countries, religious fundamentalism reflects itself with social networks. Charity organizations are so significant in that case. They work for political Islam’s infrastructure with communatarian solidarity and religious emotions. Deniz Feneri is one of them. First of all, we can observe, how Deniz Feneri explains its internal structure. Deniz Feneri describes itself as “Information technology, manpower and effective use of resources; are the most important factors in establishing a reliable and efficient system. Deniz Feneri is a humanitarian association with international standards.” And also the organisation allegates the qualities with global standards. “The donation and aid processes were handled in detail by ISO 9001 quality system initialized in 2001.” Deniz Feneri announces to the people with the question of “how can you help?” Question includes three main items : National Projects, International Projects and Gift Dialogue.
Volunteering and donations are the essential components of Deniz Feneri. It provides the network on the country. Deniz Feneri was registered as an association in 1998 and according to Deniz Feneri, it was arrived to a corporational structure in 2002. In the medium term, Deniz Feneri used its political comrade Kanal 7 (Channel 7) TV. Kanal 7 broadcasted the TV programme which was called Deniz Feneri. The organisation registered many volunteer and gained donations by the TV programme.
Deniz Feneri and Kanal 7 are the political fans of Turkey’s ruling party AKP. It’s administrational body has close relations with AKP. The organisation was accused by German courts related with corruption in 2008. There is one more Deniz Feneri in Germany but it does not reflect the reality. Different bodies work parallel and maintain network. Deniz Feneri is the one of the tool of Moderate Islam policy which targets to transfom the Turkish people into a religious society and realize social hegemony concept, as Gramsci underlined. According to Gramsci, hegemony was a form of control exercised primarily through a society's superstructure, as opposed to its base or social relations of production of a predominately economic character. Deniz Feneri is the one of the pioneer network of creating a new civil society related with non secular Islamic society. Cultural relations are the origin points of social hegemony. Why we must underline political coordination of Deniz Feneri.
Neofundamentalism is stated by Olivier Roy which is related to create a new truth. '”Neofundamentalism provides an alternative group identity that does not impinge upon the individual life of the believer, precisely because such a community is imagined and has no real social basis.” Social networks in the case of Deniz Feneri service to built new truth which is connected with Gramsci’s “truth regime”.
Israel’s Gaza operation between December 08- January 09 and Gaza’s situation after war, started intensive emotions into the innocent Palestinian people. Deniz Feneri’s campaign about Gaza’s residents directly was perceived to support Hamas not to innocent people. It can be commented political solidarity which is underlined political Islam in this context. And also this campaign indicated ruling party’s political targets to have legitimacy.
Some of the NGO’s are the main components for building a new society which is related “new truth” concept. Especially we mean NGO’s which services as the social networks in the context of religious fraternity. On this step, Butko’s article is a functional indicator to understand what we underline:
A Gramscian theoretical framework helps to demonstrate that the contemporary Islamic theorists, most specifically, seek to project Islam as a revolutionary ideological system through which to construct a unified and disciplined organisation. Consequently, they intend to extend its appeal through a deliberate and concerted strategy that aims to challenge and overthrow the current secularised regimes (i.e., hegemonic forces) and to substitute in its place a fundamentally new and unique political and social system. By constructing a viable counterhegemonic force (i.e., a political organisation erected upon religious foundations) capable of overthrowing the dominant powers, they desire not only the seizure of political power, but also to establish a genuine revolutionary movement through the creation a new society, a new morality and, most fundamentally, a new type of man. Hence, it is through the application of a Gramscian analysis that the practical and theoretical components of the contemporary phenomenon of ‘political Islam’ can be more accurately understood.
Deniz Feneri’s efforts can be evaulated to arrive political power and a new society. Althusser’s idea of “ideological state apparatuses” must be perceived with our approach. As Gramsci defined the concept of state, supported the tangible relationship between state and society. "State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion" Gramsci explained the definition with these other words. “State=Dictatorship+Hegemony”.
Also Butko indicates economic conditions as we can observe from Deniz Feneri’s challenges. “In terms of the greater revolutionary process, since Gramsci seeks to garner the support of all those individuals who are disenchanted with the current socioeconomic structure and desire its overthrow, it is a commonality or similarity in experience—a shared perception of repression, exclusion, and marginalisation— which coalesces the members of a counter-hegemonic bloc regardless of a common or shared economic condition.”
In the case of Deniz Feneri can be analyzed by Gramscian doctrine as Femia considered. “To Gramsci, the paramount aim in a ‘war of position’ is to infiltrate civil society through the dissemination of new ideas and, in the process, to intellectually and culturally prepare the ground for the volutionary movement’s assault on hegemonic dominance”.
Prof. Buğra explained the term of “sadaka” which we translated as charity related to found “alternative civil society”. Turkish PM, referred to term of sadaka “Sadaka exist in our culture.” He indicated religious culture to realize charity which related to maintain social solidarity. However, instead of social solidarity, communitarian solidarity reflected itself. Buğra’s comments underlined sadaka’s –Islamic charity- function and market economy’s situation. Prof. Buğra underlined the point in an interview which was published in daily Milliyet.
“ In 1980s to the market was so confident that the market solves all problems, there is also created employment, poverty was thought to prevent. By the 1990s it is not seen such conduct and voluntary initiatives has started to come into models. Volunteers help the charity when you already have a dose of religion is one. Hence conservatism's complete market economy, became supporter. Already we have seen today, liberalism is not a pure thing, "conservative liberalism", a system supported by institutions outside the economy.”
Deniz Feneri case, reflects “total charity” concept. It is the new application of pro Islamic social networks. Another total method is valid about “zekat” which means distribution of one fortieth of one's income as alms (one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith). All of the new total social donations are not similar with the traditional Islamic religious affiliation. Why classical approach was realized individually for centuries. New types of the pro Islamic charities are affected from modern organization’s some methods. However indicated endeavors aim to create alternative civil society for founding political Islamic state.
CONCLUSION: A SUICIDE QUESTION FOR DEMOCRACY.
“WHERE COMPETITION ENDS?”
Competition is the essential framework for a modern democratic regime. Most dangerous question is asked by Sartori. “Where competition ends?” .
Democratic tools are determiner for a sustainable democracy. Fundamentalist religious organizations –we mean not only social networks, but also political parties, etc.- target a religious totalitarian society. And related issue is to create new truth. Another allegation was stated by Fukuyama which indicated “history ends.”
Democracies do not mention a winner which would rule forever. Alternatives are -sine qua non- items for a real democracy.
Sartori explained a non competitive system which these words: “ As noted with respect to the pre-dominant party systems, the minor parties must be truly independent antagonists of the major party. If the seats are contested – that is, if the candidate of the pre-dominant party are opposed without fear and with ‘equal rights’- then competition is significant, regardless of outcome, and the meaning of ‘truly independent antagonists’ is clear enogh. “
While Turkey was shifting its economic model from import substitution to market economy, the main change was legitimized through the Turkish Islam synthesis which was supported by the September 12 military administration and the subsequent ANAP governments, exploiting the nationalist and religious sentiments of the masses. The Islamic capitalists which are known as “Anatolian Tigers” globalized in line with the globalization of the Turkish economy. Within this framework, they learned foreign languages, got familiar to information technologies, and began to visit and get to know not only the Arab states but also the US and European states as a part of their jobs although their religious sensitivities continued in their private lives. They became familiar with concepts such as the stock market, global movements of capital, multi-national companies, IMF, and the EU just in line with the advances of Turkey. In the meantime, some tariqats organized themselves in education, insurance and media sectors and preferred to develop organic cooperation with the US. They received high consideration as much to come together with the Pope and other religious leaders. The dramatic enrichment of tariqat leaders and the transformation of tariqats into economic and political power holders have traumatized the sensible segments of the Turkish society in the post-Cold War context since the disappearance of inter-block struggle uncovered the religious politics. As a result of the aforementioned bourgeoisification and globalization process, the second generation of Milli Görüş stood against the traditionalist elite of the party and started the internal struggle in Refah Partisi- (Welfare Party). After the closure of Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) the new generation founded AKP while the traditionalist Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) held onto the Milli Görüş line.
AKP and Deniz Feneri are the outcomes of these political and social developments. We can underline Deniz Feneri is related post cold war era. In this context, main threat to democracy intersects with the some orientalist approaches like Samuel Huntington. Huntington’s “clash of civizilations” concept deny democracy for the rest of the world. And also Huntington tries to end ideologies’ existence and competition. Neuman’s theory of “spiral of silence”, the fundamental values begin to be perceived as common values.
Social networks in the case of Deniz Feneri prepare registered donators, supporters and voters which would end the democratic competition. The new truth threats democracy with using of democratic forms.
REFERENCES:
Books:
Antonio Gramsci, Antonio Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1994
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion - Our Social Skin, University of Chicago Press, 1993.
John Higgins, Raymond Williams: Literature, Marxism and Cultural Materialism, Routledge, London.
Giovanni Sartori, “Where Competition Ends?”, Party and Party Systems, ECPR Press Classic, Essex, 2005.
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society Volume I, Blackwell Publishing, Cambridge, 2000.
Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, C Hurst and Co, London, 2004
Q.Hoare G. Nowell Smith (ed), Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, International Publishers and Lawrence&Wishart, New York and London,
Articles:
Joseph Femia, ‘Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci’,Political Studies,1975, 23, 1 (March), pp. 29–48.
Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Carfax Publishing, London, May 2004, 31 (1), p. 42
Internet Resources:
“Deniz Feneri Model”, http://www.denizfeneri.org/icerik.aspx?kod=DENIZFENERIMODEL
“Deniz Feneri On Ground in Palastine”, http://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/icerik.aspx?kod=PALASTINE2
Devrim Sevimay, “Asıl Mesele Sadakanın Politik İktisadı”, (interview with Prof.Buğra), Milliyet, February 23, 2009. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Guncel/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1063049&Date=23.02.2009&b=
This paper was presented by me on April 4, 2009, in New Orleans/Lousiana.
The symposium was held by Southern Sociological Society in USA. Official schedule was realized between April 1-4, 2009 in Monteolone Hotel. Symposium's theme was Inequalities Across the Life Course. Our session's name was Political Sociology I which was realized among 11:00-12:20 hours in No:161 room. My paper's name was “Middle Eastern Fundamentalist Social Networks' Functions: In the Case of Deniz Feneri”
My best regards,
Dr.Deniz Tansi
Especially in the Middle East, fundamentalist Islamist groups, gain their legitimacy with their own social networks. From Afghanistan to Palestine, different Islamist factions applicate this method. Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Palestine , Hizballah in Lebanon, have powerful social networks.
However, the social networks which is underlined in this study, can not be a solution against poverty. These fundamentalist groups feed from poverty. Social networks do not target to found a social state. And not about to reduce inequalities.
Main problem, to delay democratic demands and to establish a totalitarian religious regime.
In Turkish public opinion , the social network which is called as “Deniz Feneri” became a corruption issue. Corruption is related to support political Islam with donations. But citizens’ donations demand is about just to help innocent, poor people. Some of the social networks manipulate persons’ emotions.
“Deniz Feneri” is an indicator for understanding “Moderate Islam” debates. Moderate Islam’s financial infrastructure and political solidarity can be perceived with “Deniz Feneri”s mechanism.
We will analyze “Deniz Feneri”s approach to comment Middle Eastern social networks’ functions. In this context, will try to indicate fundemantalist social networks do not want to destroy inequalities but to maintain them for arriving or keeping political powers.
And fundamentalist approaches target to capture all spheres of the life why they are totalitarian.
“DENİZ FENERİ” CASE AS A SOCIAL NETWORK
Social networks are so strategic for the current societies. According to Castells, “religious fundametalism – Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, and even Buddhist- is probably the most formidable force for personal security and collective mobilization in these troubled times. In a world of global flows of wealth, power and images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes the fundamental source of social meaning.” Therefore religious fundamentalism feeds and creates social networks in the global world.
In Turkey, like other Middle Eastern countries, religious fundamentalism reflects itself with social networks. Charity organizations are so significant in that case. They work for political Islam’s infrastructure with communatarian solidarity and religious emotions. Deniz Feneri is one of them. First of all, we can observe, how Deniz Feneri explains its internal structure. Deniz Feneri describes itself as “Information technology, manpower and effective use of resources; are the most important factors in establishing a reliable and efficient system. Deniz Feneri is a humanitarian association with international standards.” And also the organisation allegates the qualities with global standards. “The donation and aid processes were handled in detail by ISO 9001 quality system initialized in 2001.” Deniz Feneri announces to the people with the question of “how can you help?” Question includes three main items : National Projects, International Projects and Gift Dialogue.
Volunteering and donations are the essential components of Deniz Feneri. It provides the network on the country. Deniz Feneri was registered as an association in 1998 and according to Deniz Feneri, it was arrived to a corporational structure in 2002. In the medium term, Deniz Feneri used its political comrade Kanal 7 (Channel 7) TV. Kanal 7 broadcasted the TV programme which was called Deniz Feneri. The organisation registered many volunteer and gained donations by the TV programme.
Deniz Feneri and Kanal 7 are the political fans of Turkey’s ruling party AKP. It’s administrational body has close relations with AKP. The organisation was accused by German courts related with corruption in 2008. There is one more Deniz Feneri in Germany but it does not reflect the reality. Different bodies work parallel and maintain network. Deniz Feneri is the one of the tool of Moderate Islam policy which targets to transfom the Turkish people into a religious society and realize social hegemony concept, as Gramsci underlined. According to Gramsci, hegemony was a form of control exercised primarily through a society's superstructure, as opposed to its base or social relations of production of a predominately economic character. Deniz Feneri is the one of the pioneer network of creating a new civil society related with non secular Islamic society. Cultural relations are the origin points of social hegemony. Why we must underline political coordination of Deniz Feneri.
Neofundamentalism is stated by Olivier Roy which is related to create a new truth. '”Neofundamentalism provides an alternative group identity that does not impinge upon the individual life of the believer, precisely because such a community is imagined and has no real social basis.” Social networks in the case of Deniz Feneri service to built new truth which is connected with Gramsci’s “truth regime”.
Israel’s Gaza operation between December 08- January 09 and Gaza’s situation after war, started intensive emotions into the innocent Palestinian people. Deniz Feneri’s campaign about Gaza’s residents directly was perceived to support Hamas not to innocent people. It can be commented political solidarity which is underlined political Islam in this context. And also this campaign indicated ruling party’s political targets to have legitimacy.
Some of the NGO’s are the main components for building a new society which is related “new truth” concept. Especially we mean NGO’s which services as the social networks in the context of religious fraternity. On this step, Butko’s article is a functional indicator to understand what we underline:
A Gramscian theoretical framework helps to demonstrate that the contemporary Islamic theorists, most specifically, seek to project Islam as a revolutionary ideological system through which to construct a unified and disciplined organisation. Consequently, they intend to extend its appeal through a deliberate and concerted strategy that aims to challenge and overthrow the current secularised regimes (i.e., hegemonic forces) and to substitute in its place a fundamentally new and unique political and social system. By constructing a viable counterhegemonic force (i.e., a political organisation erected upon religious foundations) capable of overthrowing the dominant powers, they desire not only the seizure of political power, but also to establish a genuine revolutionary movement through the creation a new society, a new morality and, most fundamentally, a new type of man. Hence, it is through the application of a Gramscian analysis that the practical and theoretical components of the contemporary phenomenon of ‘political Islam’ can be more accurately understood.
Deniz Feneri’s efforts can be evaulated to arrive political power and a new society. Althusser’s idea of “ideological state apparatuses” must be perceived with our approach. As Gramsci defined the concept of state, supported the tangible relationship between state and society. "State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion" Gramsci explained the definition with these other words. “State=Dictatorship+Hegemony”.
Also Butko indicates economic conditions as we can observe from Deniz Feneri’s challenges. “In terms of the greater revolutionary process, since Gramsci seeks to garner the support of all those individuals who are disenchanted with the current socioeconomic structure and desire its overthrow, it is a commonality or similarity in experience—a shared perception of repression, exclusion, and marginalisation— which coalesces the members of a counter-hegemonic bloc regardless of a common or shared economic condition.”
In the case of Deniz Feneri can be analyzed by Gramscian doctrine as Femia considered. “To Gramsci, the paramount aim in a ‘war of position’ is to infiltrate civil society through the dissemination of new ideas and, in the process, to intellectually and culturally prepare the ground for the volutionary movement’s assault on hegemonic dominance”.
Prof. Buğra explained the term of “sadaka” which we translated as charity related to found “alternative civil society”. Turkish PM, referred to term of sadaka “Sadaka exist in our culture.” He indicated religious culture to realize charity which related to maintain social solidarity. However, instead of social solidarity, communitarian solidarity reflected itself. Buğra’s comments underlined sadaka’s –Islamic charity- function and market economy’s situation. Prof. Buğra underlined the point in an interview which was published in daily Milliyet.
“ In 1980s to the market was so confident that the market solves all problems, there is also created employment, poverty was thought to prevent. By the 1990s it is not seen such conduct and voluntary initiatives has started to come into models. Volunteers help the charity when you already have a dose of religion is one. Hence conservatism's complete market economy, became supporter. Already we have seen today, liberalism is not a pure thing, "conservative liberalism", a system supported by institutions outside the economy.”
Deniz Feneri case, reflects “total charity” concept. It is the new application of pro Islamic social networks. Another total method is valid about “zekat” which means distribution of one fortieth of one's income as alms (one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith). All of the new total social donations are not similar with the traditional Islamic religious affiliation. Why classical approach was realized individually for centuries. New types of the pro Islamic charities are affected from modern organization’s some methods. However indicated endeavors aim to create alternative civil society for founding political Islamic state.
CONCLUSION: A SUICIDE QUESTION FOR DEMOCRACY.
“WHERE COMPETITION ENDS?”
Competition is the essential framework for a modern democratic regime. Most dangerous question is asked by Sartori. “Where competition ends?” .
Democratic tools are determiner for a sustainable democracy. Fundamentalist religious organizations –we mean not only social networks, but also political parties, etc.- target a religious totalitarian society. And related issue is to create new truth. Another allegation was stated by Fukuyama which indicated “history ends.”
Democracies do not mention a winner which would rule forever. Alternatives are -sine qua non- items for a real democracy.
Sartori explained a non competitive system which these words: “ As noted with respect to the pre-dominant party systems, the minor parties must be truly independent antagonists of the major party. If the seats are contested – that is, if the candidate of the pre-dominant party are opposed without fear and with ‘equal rights’- then competition is significant, regardless of outcome, and the meaning of ‘truly independent antagonists’ is clear enogh. “
While Turkey was shifting its economic model from import substitution to market economy, the main change was legitimized through the Turkish Islam synthesis which was supported by the September 12 military administration and the subsequent ANAP governments, exploiting the nationalist and religious sentiments of the masses. The Islamic capitalists which are known as “Anatolian Tigers” globalized in line with the globalization of the Turkish economy. Within this framework, they learned foreign languages, got familiar to information technologies, and began to visit and get to know not only the Arab states but also the US and European states as a part of their jobs although their religious sensitivities continued in their private lives. They became familiar with concepts such as the stock market, global movements of capital, multi-national companies, IMF, and the EU just in line with the advances of Turkey. In the meantime, some tariqats organized themselves in education, insurance and media sectors and preferred to develop organic cooperation with the US. They received high consideration as much to come together with the Pope and other religious leaders. The dramatic enrichment of tariqat leaders and the transformation of tariqats into economic and political power holders have traumatized the sensible segments of the Turkish society in the post-Cold War context since the disappearance of inter-block struggle uncovered the religious politics. As a result of the aforementioned bourgeoisification and globalization process, the second generation of Milli Görüş stood against the traditionalist elite of the party and started the internal struggle in Refah Partisi- (Welfare Party). After the closure of Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) the new generation founded AKP while the traditionalist Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) held onto the Milli Görüş line.
AKP and Deniz Feneri are the outcomes of these political and social developments. We can underline Deniz Feneri is related post cold war era. In this context, main threat to democracy intersects with the some orientalist approaches like Samuel Huntington. Huntington’s “clash of civizilations” concept deny democracy for the rest of the world. And also Huntington tries to end ideologies’ existence and competition. Neuman’s theory of “spiral of silence”, the fundamental values begin to be perceived as common values.
Social networks in the case of Deniz Feneri prepare registered donators, supporters and voters which would end the democratic competition. The new truth threats democracy with using of democratic forms.
REFERENCES:
Books:
Antonio Gramsci, Antonio Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1994
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion - Our Social Skin, University of Chicago Press, 1993.
John Higgins, Raymond Williams: Literature, Marxism and Cultural Materialism, Routledge, London.
Giovanni Sartori, “Where Competition Ends?”, Party and Party Systems, ECPR Press Classic, Essex, 2005.
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society Volume I, Blackwell Publishing, Cambridge, 2000.
Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, C Hurst and Co, London, 2004
Q.Hoare G. Nowell Smith (ed), Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, International Publishers and Lawrence&Wishart, New York and London,
Articles:
Joseph Femia, ‘Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci’,Political Studies,1975, 23, 1 (March), pp. 29–48.
Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Carfax Publishing, London, May 2004, 31 (1), p. 42
Internet Resources:
“Deniz Feneri Model”, http://www.denizfeneri.org/icerik.aspx?kod=DENIZFENERIMODEL
“Deniz Feneri On Ground in Palastine”, http://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/icerik.aspx?kod=PALASTINE2
Devrim Sevimay, “Asıl Mesele Sadakanın Politik İktisadı”, (interview with Prof.Buğra), Milliyet, February 23, 2009. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Guncel/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1063049&Date=23.02.2009&b=
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